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  Abstract 
Warwick Junction, a thriving trading hub in the inner city of Durban, has long been 
considered one of the best examples of collaborative urban management practices 
between the local government and informal traders. In a post-apartheid South Africa, 
there was a national desire to transform the old systems of governance, which in 
Warwick translated to city government institutions making an effort to include informal 
traders in the policymaking and management processes. This paper tracks the history of 
Warwick Junction, using its oppressive past to frame common perspectives of informal 
trade. It considers the legacy of the post-apartheid era South Africa, how it led to an 
effective area based management initiative, and what has transpired since. Primarily 
relying on interviews, it will present a variety of perspectives from a variety of 
stakeholders: past and present City officials, formal shopkeepers, informal traders, and 
leaders of local non-governmental organizations. This paper will find that the spirit of 
collaboration from the early period of the post-apartheid period has broken down over 
time. While City officials and informal traders offer different accounts, a common trend 
is that much work remains to be done in the Warwick area, yet the processes to 
complete this reform are no longer collaborative. This paper will offer some 
explanations for the deterioration but will ultimately suggest the need for more research 






























Despite the nuanced nature, history, and role of the informal economy, one trend 
continues to persist: informal trade is often viewed as a nuisance or problem to be 
rectified or ignored. Although the fact that it makes up a substantial part of many 
developing countries’ gross domestic products, government policies tend to be reactive 
instead of being proactive. Across the globe, interventions are sporadic, unfocused and 
inconsistent. South Africa, a developing country battling high unemployment rates and 
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a repressive history dating from the colonial and apartheid eras, had the opportunity to 
reverse this pattern when it transitioned to a democracy in 1994.1 The national desire to 
reconcile and harmonize in many ways characterized the methods and process of 
governance.2 Warwick Junction, transportation and trading hub on the outskirts of 
Durban’s inner city, presents a fascinating case study of these approaches. Often cited 
as one of the best examples of innovative and integrated urban management and area-
based policy, academic literature focuses on Warwick in the period immediately after 
apartheid.  
Yet, as this paper will show, twenty years after the establishment of democracy, 
the condition of governance in Warwick has deteriorated although, in a glaring gap, 
little literature addresses this. Despite these gaps, this paper will explain the informal 
trade sector on a global scale, and provide a narrative and analysis of street vending in 
Durban and South Africa. The purpose of this paper is understand how the inclusive, 
area based management governance model in Warwick broke down, and what 
implications that suggests. 
To convey this, this paper is organized into five sections. First, it will offer an 
overview of the relevant literature, and an analysis of the gaps in the academia. Next, it 
will provide the necessary background information to contextualize the most recent 
                                                 
1 Skinner, C. (2008). The Struggle for the Streets: Processes of Exclusion and Inclusion of Street Traders in 
Durban, South Africa. Development Southern Africa Vol. 25, No. 2, 227-242.   
2 Dobson, R. Former Project Leader. Formal Interview. 14 November 2013.  
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events, which have not yet been incorporated into academic literature. The penultimate 
section establishes the methodology and limitations of the project. Lastly, the paper will 
recount its findings and draw conclusions. 
 
Literature Review 
To understand the nature of informal trade, and how institutions and social 
relations exist around it, this paper will review some of the extensive literature written 
on the informal economy. In addition, it will examine a management policy particularly 
relevant to Warwick Junction during the end of the apartheid period. Lastly, it will offer 
an overview of the state and extent of informal trade in South Africa, providing a 
narrative and analysis of street trading in Durban, concluding with an assessment on 
the current state of literature regarding Warwick Junction.  
 
Global Trends and Debates 
Street trading is a controversial, fluctuating, and diverse occupation present in 
virtually every area of the world.3 Particularly prevalent in developing countries, the 
informal economy accounts for 50-75% of the non-agricultural employment. Broken 
down regionally, the informal trade sector makes up 78% of the non-agricultural labor 
                                                 
3 Bromley, R. (2000). Street Vending and Public Policy: A Global Review. The International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy 20.1/2, 1-28. 1 
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force in Africa, 57% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 45-85% in Asia.4 Informal 
trade practices vary: traders may sell services, merchandise or a mixture of the two. 
Some may be mobile and hawk from trays or carts, while others set up kiosks or rely on 
fixed stalls, while still others simply lay their goods out on the ground. Traders may sell 
seasonally or year-round. They may change the goods they offer depending on the time 
of day and what needs consumers may have, selling breakfast or hot drinks in the 
morning as commuters make their way to work, or fresh produce in the afternoons as 
customers return home to cook dinner. Goods may range from cooked foods and 
groceries to electrical appliances, hardware, clothing, or mechanical repairs.5 Traders 
may rely on assistants or family as partners, depend on neighbors to tend their stalls, 
create branches of their businesses or work completely alone. Street trading can be a 
person’s last resort to survive or simply may be a lifestyle choice.6 In addition, many 
other activities, from public transportation such as taxis and buses, to garbage 
collection, street cleaning and maintenance are closely tied to street trading.7 This sector 
is complex and nuanced, which presents considerable urban management challenges 
and creates controversial debates as to the role and legitimacy of the informal economy.  
                                                 
4 Quazi, T. (2011). An Analysis of Municipal Approaches to Incorporating the Informal Economy into the 
Urban Fabric: A Comparative Study of Msunduzi Local Municipality (Pietermaritzburg) and Hibiscus 
Coast Municipality (Port Shepstone). University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies, 1-82. 11 
5 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 2 
6 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 2, Cross, J. (2000). Street Vendors, Modernity and 
Postmodernity: Conflict and Compromise in the Global Economy. The International Journal of Sociology and 
Social Policy 20.1/2, 29-51. 7 
7 Bromley  “Street Vending and Public Policy” 2 
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In his global review of street vending and public policy, Ray Bromley 
summarizes the main arguments justifying the existence and extent of street trade. For 
one, street traders contribute directly to the economy, and their eradication would have 
serious and negative economic consequences. Not only does street trading advance 
economic activity but it is also a potential and actual source of revenue for the 
government through tax regulation. In addition, street trading offers the government a 
respite from expanding the welfare, police, court or prison systems as it provides 
employment and a safety net to the traders and their dependents. Another point is that 
street traders bring vitality and resources to the streets that cannot be replicated. Not 
only do street traders create an atmosphere, their presence and potential as witnesses 
may deter crime. Street traders also expand the range and timing of services that can be 
provided and serve as an effective way to cater for “seasonal, sporadic and special 
demands” such as food during sporting events or trinkets for holidays. Expanding on 
that argument, they are able to test new products on the market at low costs. Not only 
does street trading create a “laboratory for family business and social interaction,” it 
offers entrepreneurial opportunities as a self-help, grassroots initiative. Bromley cites 
Hernando de Soto (1989), stating that street trading encourages the independence of 
“hard-working poor people [from] an obstructive, ‘mercantilist’ system…controlled by 
the interests of career bureaucrats and big businesses.”8 Lastly, street trading has a 
                                                 
8 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 3 
 10 
deeply rooted history in many countries. Yet a vocal resistance to informal trading 
combats these historical, cultural, entrepreneurial, and economic arguments.  
Despite the opportunities it provides for its workforce, street trading is often 
seen as an illegitimate and unsightly blight on ‘modern’ cities. Critics blame traders for 
vehicular and pedestrian congestion, as traders are drawn to busy areas where demand 
may be high, which ultimately poses a public safety hazard. In addition, this crowding 
may provide opportunities for petty crime. The movement of traders may also result in 
them “blocking” formal businesses and forestalling off-street establishments, giving 
them an unfair advantage.  The fact that street traders “often fail to give receipts and 
keep accounts, to pay taxes on their earnings, and to charge sales or value,” enhances 
this advantage. Benefitting from the lack of taxes and fewer overheads, they may 
undercut their formal competition. The culture of street trading generates noise which 
may disturb pedestrians and motorists, creating “unreasonable nuisance” concerns. In 
addition, garbage often litters the streets as a result of the traffic, traders and their 
customers. Lastly, there have been health and safety concerns as informal traders are 
more exposed to sun, air pollution and contamination.9 These are the practical 
arguments against the presence of informal traders on the streets. 
A more theoretical point is the orthodox Marxist view that considers street 
traders as “the epitome of surplus labor and underemployment.” Deterring labor from 
                                                 
9 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 5, Quazi 7 
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legitimate work in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, education and health, care 
fields, this perspective argues informal trade is “dysfunctional to the economy as a 
whole.”10 While not entirely consistent, this view reinforces the structuralist perspective 
on street trading which came out of the 1970s and 1980s. Structuralists took the position 
that informal trading occurred as a result of capitalism’s inability to absorb the masses 
of unemployed.11 While they may not see it as quite the nuisance Marxists perceive it as, 
the implication is that structuralists also see street trading as a result of a flawed 
economic system.  
These theoretical stances illustrate the fact that negative perceptions of street 
trading remain. A variety of political perspectives, from right-and left-wing statists, 
modernists and authoritarians, characterize street trading as a “manifestation of 
poverty and underdevelopment,” a view that is shared by many governments.12 
Bromley summarizes a common state of affairs for street traders: 
“In many cities and countries, police and municipal inspectors have 
threatened, chased, arrested and occasionally beaten street vendors, and 
their goods have often been confiscated. Aggressive policing is 
particularly notable just before major public and tourist events, on the 
assumption that orderly streets improve the image of the city to visitors. 
In some Third World Counties such policies have been carried out to 
vicious extremes, when police, soldiers or para-military forces have 
                                                 
10 Bromley 5 
11 Skinner, Caroline. (2008). Street Trade in Africa: A Review. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing 
and Organizing, Working Paper No. 51, 1-37. 5 
12 Bromley “Street Vending and Public Policy” 6 
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confiscated street vendors’ identity papers, physically expelled vendors 
from the city, and even tortured or killed a few vendors.”13 
 
This brings light to the driving tension regarding street trade and the informal 
economy. The ‘disorder’ of these markets contradicts the organized, efficient and 
structured world championed by Marx and the Euro-American value system.14 That 
being said, street trading, despite its setbacks and critics, continues to be a thriving and 
growing source of work, with the potential for more expansion.15  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 Although this paper will not delve too deeply into conceptual frameworks, a 
little background will provide some valuable structure. One perspective, the political 
economy theory, which focuses on policy and institutional environments and the 
subsequent connections to administrative practices, relates well to informal trade 
management. The political economy approach attempts to understand and explain the 
interactions between economic, political and social policies, institutions and processes. 
The theory examines how physical space, cultural norms and social relations are 
affected issues of domination, power and resource allocation. This perspective asserts 
that prevalent institutions drive urban management and that city governance is based 
on current economic, political and social circumstances. Constantly evolving, urban 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Cross “ Street Vendors, Modernity and Postmodernity” 3-4 
15 Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 16 
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plans strongly affect both the informal and formal economy, and their interactions and 
adaptations reflect the power struggle as the various groups attempt to hold and gather 
resources. Most importantly, this theory draws on the factors that affect political and 
institutional environments as well as those environments’ capacity to change.16 
 This framework ties to the urban challenges that have arisen in South Africa as a 
result of inherited institutions and infrastructures. Many studies point to that fact many 
developing countries, particularly those in the global South, rely on inherited systems 
that were planned by colonial governments or adapted from Northern contexts and to 
meet modernized expectations. These expectations are focused on “suiting local 
political and ideological ends [with] aspirations of modern urbanization.”17 This creates 
tension for traders who are challenged by this infrastructure and these expectations, 
while simultaneously creating difficulties for government officials who must manage 
them. 
 
Urban Management Approaches  
As previously mentioned, the complex nature of the informal economy presents 
serious urban management challenges. Although some governments may be tempted to 
simply overlook the entire informal economy or repress and abuse street traders, its 
consistent growth and widespread prevalence across the world demands attention. 
                                                 
16 Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 7-8 
17 Ibid. 
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Instead of continuing to focus on how it may devalue a city’s modern status, inclusive 
urban management processes would be ideal. Much of the scholarship regarding the 
policy practices for the informal economy focuses on case studies, such as Warwick 
Junction in Durban, South Africa. While this paper will address and consider that 
model, an overview of inclusive urban management debates is valuable.  
In particular, integrated and area based policies offer a worthwhile approach. For 
the purposes of this paper, we will subscribe to Ivan Turok’s definition of area-based 
policies. As the name suggests these are policies explicitly focused on an area rather 
than a national or provincial scale. Yet the substance in that definition comes from the 
acknowledgement that an area based policy (ABP) is intended to change or improve the 
nature of a geographical area using a process that involves all stakeholders, including 
community members that may be overlooked when using other approaches. There is an 
acceptance that place and space matter, and affect both economic and social processes. 
This method tends to accept a variety of social, economic and physical development 
concerns and priorities, such as businesses, human resources, and neighborhood and 
social economies.18 In addition, it realizes that management must cross a variety of 
government fields and departments such as education, housing, transport and 
economic development, and that a uniform approach, particularly regarding the 
allocation of resources or regulations, is not ideal. Instead, every policy approach and 
                                                 
18 Cameron, J., Odendaal, N. & Todes, A. (2004) Integrated Area Development Projects: Working towards 
Innovation and Sustainability. Urban Forum, Vol. 15, No. 4. 316 
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structure will depend entirely on the nature of each area and its accompanying 
geographical and institutional contexts.19 
However, that final point – that policies are unique to the area – illustrates one of 
the key objections against ABPs. The entire system can be critiqued as too inefficient 
and difficult to manage as policies inconsistent with national priorities become 
institutionalized. Further, community participation is not necessarily an easy or 
harmonious process as different needs or values arise. In that vein, the allocation of 
resources is meant to reflect greater needs, but meets with resistance on many levels. 
This shift of resources may be seen as deviating from “statutory obligations” to provide 
equal services. There is particular pressure on authorities from wealthier 
neighborhoods to maintain consistent levels of spending across the board, instead of 
“bending” programs to benefit the poor. In addition, there could be unforeseen 
consequences of focusing in particular regions, as issues may be displaced into 
surrounding areas. In particular, if a jurisdiction changes or expands, the policies may 
no longer be as effective, and the area may become unmanageable. Another concern is 
that ABPs are characterized by bottom up transformation, which requires flexibility as 
services and standards may be changed to meet with the community’s needs. There is 
less space to govern by the rigid protocols of national programs like the welfare system. 
This means that achieving the desired change requires additional commitment from the 
                                                 
19 Turok, I. The Rationale for Area-Based Policies: Lessons from International Experience. Urban 
Reconstruction in the Developing World: Learning through an International Best Practice, 405-412. 1-2 
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local departments to incorporate the priorities and needs of neighborhood reforms, 
which is not necessarily viable.  On a related note, the last criticism of ABP Turok 
recognizes is the challenge of coordinated, inter-departmental policymaking and 
resource deployment. A key to ABP is strategically breaking down the “silos and 
funnels” through which decisions are made and services are delivered to coordinate 
and “link complementary elements of provision together.”20 Yet, as with the bottom up 
reform, this flexibility and willingness is often contradictory to the nature of many 
government institutions and poses consequential challenges.  
However, these critiques are challenged, if not denounced, by the arguments for 
ABPs. The involvement of the community allows for more flexible and customized 
approaches to governance. The policy that generates from ABPs is “more intensive, 
person-centered and [proactively supportive] than is usually provided or available 
through government schemes.”21 This inclusive approach has a few key characteristics.  
One of the traditional objectives is to inform the decision makers of local needs and 
preferences, which in turn gives a voice to people who are often under-represented in 
the policy process. This may even serve to diffuse a volatile situation. Over time, this 
process has become recognized as a method of constructive engagement and capacity 
building. It came about as a result of people recognizing that the capacity of the 
                                                 
20 Turok “The Rationale for Area Based Policies” 8 
21 Turok “The Rationale for Area Based Policies” 6 
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government is finite, that there may be untapped resources available in the community, 
and the possibility that harnessing the community’s resources may benefit all involved.  
Other benefits include the encouragement of community activism and 
autonomy. While there may be many organizations in place, from church groups, youth 
clubs and sports associations, this process of equipping these bodies with greater skills 
and confidence better prepares them to take advantage of external opportunities. This 
strengthening of a community’s ‘social economy’ will sustain its commitment and 




South African Informal Economy 
It is impossible to analyze the nature of street trading in South Africa, or examine 
the existing scholarship, without briefly explaining the history of that sector in South 
Africa. A great deal of scholarship contextualizes itself around or immediately after the 
apartheid era. However, as Stein Nesvag elucidates, even before apartheid rule, policies 
from the colonial era targeted informal traders. Legislation like the 1981 Chapter 14 
Natal Code of Natal Law and Zululand Proclamation in 1985 limited muthi (traditional 
African medicine) trade, clearly singling out African traders. Only a few years later in 
                                                 
22 Turok “The Rationale for Area Based Policies” 6-7 
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1987, Act No. 18 legislation was passed giving authorities discretionary power to refuse 
licenses to “all applicants whose premises were in an unhygienic condition or who were 
unable to comply with the conditions of the Insolvency law regarding the keeping of 
proper accounts.”23 While hygienic regulation is a logical concern, Nesvag argues that 
the focus on proper accounts would particularly impact informal traders. Similarly, the 
1909 Native Beer Act negatively affected female traders who sold beer as it established a 
municipality monopoly on the substance.  
As national legislation became more restrictive over the next fifty years, the 
policies continued to target African informal traders. The Native or Urban Areas Act of 
1923, an outcome of the Stallard Commission Report, limited Africans’ ability to work 
in the urban areas. As the report concluded, “Africans were required in cities for the 
sole reason of servicing white needs, and once they ceased to do so, they were to depart 
back to the reserves,” black traders had little autonomy to cater to consumers, and 
never on their own terms.24 Other legislation, particularly the Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act (1945) reinforced this persecution. The Consolidation Act continued 
to impose restrictions on economic activities even in so-called “black areas.”25 This trend 
of persecution only continued in the apartheid era as non-whites, who make up the 
informal trade sector, continued to be targeted.  
                                                 
23 Nesvag, S. (2000). Street Trading from Apartheid to Post-Apartheid: More Birds in the Cornfield? The 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 20.3/4, 34-63. 3-4 
24 Nesvag “Street Trading from Apartheid to Post-Apartheid” 4 
25 Skinner “The Struggle for the Streets” 5 
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The Group Areas Act (1950) excluded people from areas of the city based on 
their race, which essentially barred Africans from trading.26 The 1957 Witchcraft 
Suppression Act banned the trading of medicine and herbs, completely cutting muthi 
traders out of the economy. The effects of this act were felt for almost thirty years, as 
muthi traders did not begin openly trading until the 1980s.27 However, despite these 
regulations, the national government struggled to maintain control of informal traders, 
which led to new legislation. For example, in the KwaZulu-Natal region, the Natal 
Ordinance was passed in 1973, establishing the “move on” laws. These laws, although 
technically allowing informal trading, were hugely restrictive. While traders were able 
to hawk their goods, they had to move along from their spot within 15 minutes and 
were not allowed to return that day. In addition, the traders could not be closer than 100 
meters from a formal business.28 Although this is merely a sampling, these laws offer 
insight into the extent of the anti-informal trade attitudes the colonial and apartheid 
governments subscribed to. 
To bring the narrative up to date, the post-apartheid era of democracy brought in 
a new approach to governance. Skinner argues there was a national surge to transform 
institutional structures into more collaborative entities. Local governments were given 
                                                 
26 Shipley, B. and R. Richards. (2013). Warwick Junction Urban Renewal Project. Participedia. 
<http://participedia.net/en/cases/warwick-junction-urban-renewal-project>. 
27 Dobson, R. and C. Skinner. (2009). Working in Warwick: Including Street Traders in Urban Plans. 
University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies. Print. 
28 Dobson and Skinner “Working in Warwick” 45 
 20 
greater independence to supervise their areas, which would prove vital to informal 
trade management. There was a general trend of deregulation which contributed to the 
rapid expansion of the informal trade sector. For example, the 1991 Business Act helped 
to deregulate business activities, removed barriers to the operation of informal 
activities, and made it an offense to enforce the move-along laws.29 The new 
Constitution (1996) mandated local governments to take certain approaches to informal 
trade: namely to promote local development and focus on pro-poor urban policies to 
assist employment opportunities, to re-regulate the informal economy and, lastly, to 
emphasize “participation and consultation” to practice democratic governance.30 
However, the rapidly increasing levels of urbanization and growing prevalence of 
informal activities, particularly around transport nodes on the peripheries of city 
centers and in public areas, have created infrastructure, facility and resource challenges 
for local governments.  
As the current situation stands, the informal trade sector is a consequential part 
of the South African economy. To offer some statistical context, unemployment rates are 
high, hovering around 25%.31 The formal economy is unable to absorb these 
unemployed, who then turn to the informal economy to provide a source of income. In 
the period from 1997-2003, that growing unemployment and the small capacity for 
                                                 
29 Skinner “The Struggle for the Streets” 6 
30 Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 19 
31 Trading Economics. South African Unemployment Rate. 25 November 2013. 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate>. 
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growth in the formal economy caused the informal economy to expand drastically. In 
2003, about 25.1% of the South African population was employed in the informal 
economy; about 1.9 million people vs. the 965,000 who made up that sector in 1997. 
Now, the informal economy contributes to about 8-12% of the country’s GDP.32  It must 
be noted that these statistics ought to be treated with caution as they do not account for 
informal workers in rural economies or the changing nature of the informal sector as 
seasonal work offers temporary employment opportunities. In fact, there is little data on 
the actual expanse of the informal economy, other than that it has a significant presence. 
Nonetheless, this portion of the South African workforce faces many challenges, and is 
a vulnerable population.  
For over a century, informal workers were largely unrecognized as contributors 
to the economy. Even now, although they may be recognized, they face other 
challenges. For one, many of the informal traders are migrants from other African 
countries, who then may not speak the local languages and are more likely to be 
unaware of their rights. Much of the literature regarding informal trade examines or 
mentions the role of foreign vendors working on South African streets. A study by Nina 
Hunter and Caroline Skinner, “Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City Durban: 
Local Government Policy Challenges,” examined the policy challenges of having 
foreign street traders working on Durban streets. In their final policy recommendations, 
                                                 
32 Quazi “An Analysis of Municipal Approaches” 16-17 
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they noted that Durban’s new Informal Economy Policy (IEP) acknowledged the issue 
of foreign street traders. Yet many of the policy recommendations the IEP proposed 
have, as of yet, been ignored.33 In addition, many of the traders in the informal 
workforce are largely uneducated. One study indicated that as few as 10% of the 
informal traders completed high school.34 Perhaps most importantly, there is a strong 
correlation between poverty and informal trade. Despite the fact that informal traders 
make up about 16-20% of the South African labor force, and a large number of these 
traders are either the sole breadwinners for their families or at least have a substantial 
number of dependents, a study of Durban street traders found that the average weekly 
profit was R102. More staggering is the fact that almost 50% of the traders in the study 
reported profits of less than R60 per week.35 In addition to the personal challenges this 
workforce faces, and despite the reformed policies of the post-apartheid era, street 
traders are still subject to complicated, and in many ways abusive, sanctions.  
 
The Narrative of Street Trade in Warwick Junction, Durban 
The history of informal trade in Durban is extensive, complex and noteworthy. 
One area in particular, Warwick Junction, highlights the challenges and struggles of 
informal trade for South Africa. Warwick Junction is Durban’s largest transportation 
                                                 
33 Hunter, N. and C. Skinner. (2003). Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City Durban: Local 
Government Policy Challenges. Urban Forum, Vol. 14, No. 4, October-December 2003, 301-319. 313 
34 Ibid. 9 
35 Skinner “The Struggle for the Streets” 4 
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node and trading hub, located on the outskirts of the inner city. About 460,000 people 
walk through the area daily, which hosts between 5,000 – 8,000 traders. In addition, 300 
buses and 1,550 minibus taxis depart from the junction on a daily basis and 38,000 
vehicles pass through daily.36 More importantly, Warwick Junction is considered a 
shining example of a progressive and innovative approach to integrating the informal 
traders into the management and development practices of the area. Yet the narrative of 
Warwick Junction, covered extensively in many academic articles, is crucial to 
understanding and analyzing the modern dynamics of the area as this paper sets out to.  
The national legislation described above shaped the nature of informal trade in 
Durban. Like the rest of the country, Durban had repressive apartheid-era legislation 
imposed on the informal traders, restricting their ability to work. However, when the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) won local government elections in the early 1980s, a 
new era of progressive policies was ushered in. Stein Nesvag explains a few of the 
factors that inspired the city council to shift policies:  
• A realization that law enforcement was becoming increasingly ineffective; 
• A concession of the economic immorality and dysfunctionality of the existing 
legislation; 
• An escalating urban unemployment, as well as massive urbanization as 
apartheid influx controls began collapsing; 
• Organized mass resistance and strong international pressure against the 
apartheid; 
• An increasing international focus on the informal sector and its potential 
contribution to solving problems of unemployment and poverty; 
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• The general international move towards economic liberalization37 
In response to these pressures and to assess the approaches to street trading 
Durban had been practicing, the PFP commissioned two reports: the 1983 Market 
Survey and the 1984 Hawker Report. Both suggested a complete reversal from 
established policy, radically concluding, “The illegal status of the street trader [must] be 
re-evaluated.”38 Instead of endorsing the original plan that would have, staying true to 
apartheid-era development, moved the informal sector in Warwick Junction from the 
central business district to a separate area, the reports recognized the importance of the 
location of informal market areas to attract business. In addition, the reports made two 
other crucial points. For one, they argued for a simpler approach to regulation, 
particularly regarding licensing laws and the establishment of “immune zones,” in 
which the traders could operate on a “first-come, first served” basis. The second point 
was the recognition that control is key for a functioning informal economy, but that 
such regulation must be fair to the traders. These arguments did not only completely 
disregard previous policy, but advocated on the part of the traders.39 
As a result, with the intention of trying to find ways to implement more practical 
and favorable policies for street traders, the City formed the Councilor’s Subcommittee 
in 1985. As national trends became more progressive and gave more power to local 
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authorities with the 1987 National White Paper of Privatization and Deregulation, the 
1991 Business Act, and the 1993 Amended Business Act, the Subcommittee and City of 
Durban amended and revised policy.  
Signs of Durban’s commitment to assist traders became evident when the City 
published its by-laws in 1995. Unlike Johannesburg, which made the entire inner city a 
no-trade zone, Durban, while prohibiting some areas of the inner city as trade zones, 
established restricted zones and trading sites. However, this more progressive policy 
was hampered by Durban’s mandate to stay consistent with national legislation which 
insisted all by-laws state “that traders who contravene any of these clauses, including 
trading in an area declared restricted or prohibited, will have their goods removed and 
impounded and be liable to pay a fine or be imprisoned.” Sanctions against traders 
continued to be criminal rather than administrative, and “1996 was marked by this 
tough stance towards street trading.”40  
Yet, despite these setbacks, the trend of integration and negotiation in Warwick 
Junction continued throughout the next decade, as street trading boomed in the 1990s. 
The substantial growth of street trading in Durban was not simply due to the 
increasingly lenient policies of the 1980s but also as a result of several natural disasters, 
including two floods and a severe drought which drove rural South Africans into the 
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city.41 To handle the growing population of traders and changing policies, various 
organizations were established to better facilitate interactions between traders and the 
City, including the Self Employed Women’s Union in 1994, the Informal Traders 
Management Board in 1995, StreetNet in 2002, Siyagunda in 2005, and Asiye eTafuleni 
in 2008. Most importantly, the City launched an ABM initiative in 1996: the Urban 
Renewal Project (the iTRUMP Project). Establishing an ABM policy allowed the City to 
cooperatively tackle urban management challenges, diminish contentious relationships 
between urban managers and informal traders, and led to more appropriate 
interventions for the informal traders. While various organizations and actors played 
key roles in the development and management reform around Warwick, the City’s 
iTRUMP Project is the source of praise as it sought to integrate traders into discussions 
and, through the Informal Economy Policy, institutionalized the City’s reformed policy 
towards informal trade. 
Previously, City interventions had been sporadic and ineffective as each 
government department failed to communicate and responded differently to 
challenges. However, the new policy of collaboration meant that the City worked with 
informal traders, their organizations, and a variety of government departments to 
establish the necessary management and ongoing reform around Warwick Junction and 
the markets. Recognizing different sectors had unique needs, the City designed and 
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created specific infrastructure, including storage space, tailored to the needs of specific 
informal trade sectors. Within the span of three years, Warwick Junction became a safer, 
cleaner and more vibrant space where informal trade flourishes.42 Most importantly, the 
City attempted to institutionalize its approach and policy towards the informal 
economy. However, despite Durban’s progressive post-apartheid policies, the City’s 
approach in the last decade has begun to shift and the situation is worsening for 
informal traders. There has been a disjuncture between the intent of the legislation and 
the implementation on the ground. While the policies were intended to be inclusive and 
protect their rights, the traders are becoming marginalized.43  In June 2004, Metro Police 
removed traders’ goods at various intersections throughout the city, specifically the 
central business district and neighboring middle-class suburbs. The Daily News reported 
a Metro Police spokesperson saying “We have seized tons of their goods in our clean up 
operation… We won’t let up until we have cleaned them all out.”44  Later that year, the 
Council approved the Public Realm Management Project, intended to stop “illegal 
unlicensed street trading.” A R3.7 million budget was assigned to the project for six 
months to employ and equip 50 Metro Police Officers. Ironically named “Peace 
Officers,” they were armed. The City justified this decision citing complaints from 
formal business owners. Supposedly, as The Daily News reported, “Illegal street traders 
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are creating a terrible headache for shop [owners and members of the public…It is 
important to make sure [the city] also addresses the needs of the city’s rates base by 
ensuring the concerns of formal businesses.”45 
 Most recently, tensions have been growing between the various Warwick 
Junction stakeholders over a proposed development in the area. In preparation for the 
2010 FIFA World Cup, the City proposed to replace the Early Morning Market, one of 
the largest and oldest markets of Warwick, with a mall. Keeping true to Bromley’s point 
about aggressive policing before a major tourist event, the City’s approach was 
combative and exclusive. In complete contradiction of its own rules, the City failed to 
follow the appropriate regulations. The City did not consult the traders about the 
renovations, nor did it complete an environmental impact assessment.46 Newspaper 
stories illustrate the extent of the tension as violence erupted between traders and the 
police on a few occasions.  
 However, the fact that newspaper stories are the primary source of information 
about the current Warwick Junction is noteworthy in its own way. There are massive 
amounts of literature regarding the informal economy and its accompanying policies in 
developing countries. As already mentioned, Warwick Junction and Durban’s policies 
are often cited and heralded as excellent and innovative approaches to managing and 
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integrating informal trade into the economy and policymaking process. Yet it seems 
that the conciliatory attitudes that were so prevalent at the end of the apartheid era 
have begun to fade as relationships between Warwick Junction stakeholders 
deteriorated. Although the largest controversy, that of a proposed mall, has only been 
an issue in the last five years, little academic literature has been written on the turn in 
the City Council’s approach and its implications for inclusive management. In a paper 
from 2009, one notable expert, Caroline Skinner, divulged a preliminary analysis 
pointing to two issues that may have driven this change: the relationship between the 
city and private property developers and the desire for a ‘modern’ city to shine when 
hosting the World Cup. However, Skinner was very clear that she would be conducting 
a more detailed analysis,47 and as of yet, that brief mention makes up the existing 
literature on the actual state of affairs of Warwick Junction.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the ongoing debates and concerns about the perceived disarray of the 
informal trade sector, it continues to have a widespread presence on a global scale. A 
review of the literature on informal trade policies shows that although many 
governments attempt to turn a blind eye, this portion of the economy must eventually 
be considered and accounted for. Yet the fact remains that, at least in South Africa, 
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national mandates regarding the informal economy are unclear and much of the 
legislative responsibility is passed on to local governments. This delegation results in 
many of the informal economy matters being dealt with on a local level, resulting in 
area-based management approaches as an effective means to develop and manage the 
informal economy. The case study of Warwick Junction is such an example. Realizing 
that disregarding an entire sector or implementing restrictive policies was ineffective, 
Durban engaged in an area based policymaking and urban development process at the 
end of the apartheid. Earlier, this paper explained the rationale behind and debates 
surrounding ABPs. One characteristic of ABPs is that they are often seen as incubators 
and laboratories to pioneer new policy approaches and strategies. Theoretically, if local 
initiatives are successful, they ought to be passed along and implemented, perhaps with 
changes based on the environment in other areas.48 In this case, that is exactly what 
occurred at Warwick Junction. Yet recent events and the current situation of Warwick 
indicates that the ABPs may not have been as effective as initial literature and reviews 
believed it to be so, indicating a gap in academic evaluations.  
 
Background Information 
Although the literature review presents substantial information as to the context 
of informal trade in South Africa and Durban, certain recent events, not yet covered in 
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academic literature, merit commentary to understand the findings of this paper. 
Namely, how the debates from the last five years have changed the landscape of 
Warwick Junction.  
One particularly salient debate stemmed from a proposed mall in the Warwick 
Junction area. South Africa won the bid to host the Soccer World Cup in 2008. As 
mentioned in the literature review, in anticipation of a major tourist event, aggressive 
policing and policy often become the norm when a country is determined to appeal to 
foreign eyes.49 This phenomenon held particularly true during the years preceding the 
2010 World Cup. As part of Durban’s R6 billion redesign and development plans, in 
May 2009, the city introduced a plan to upgrade and revitalize Warwick Junction. A city 
spokesperson declared, “Durban’s neglected transportation hub, Warwick Junction is 
set to receive a major facelift to make the city ready for the influx of visitors during the 
spectacular soccer tournament.”50 The proposed development, with a R400 million 
budget, was given a R100 million initial investment to begin the various stages of work, 
which would ultimately include road and freeway realignments and a more logical 
positioning of taxi ranks. Although these changes may have been acceptable, 
community outraged surged at the last proposition: a new mall with banking and retail 
facilities.51  
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City officials, such as Michael Sutcliffe who was the City Manager at the time, 
argued that the City was “making sure [it was] doing things that complement each 
other,” and that the creation of a mall would incorporate three key developments for 
the area. It would involve the private sector in an area it had not previously had a great 
presence, as well as restructuring public transport across Warwick Junction, and 
formalizing a tidier transportation hub. Lastly, according to Sutcliffe, this development 
was intended to get the traders on the city’s side, as “the city promised to find space for 
all the African traders” (emphasis added).52 The developers insisted the shopping center 
would be able to accommodate 270 of the 300 traders the City recognized in the Early 
Morning Market, while the ones who could not be integrated would be relocated to a 
site 300 meters away.53 Generally, this side of the debate insisted that not only would 
the mall improve traffic flow, it would provide a much-needed range of retail choices. A 
representative for the development company, Themba Ngcobo, justified the shopping 
center saying Urban-Econ, a development economy firm, had conducted a feasibility 
study and found the need for a wider range of products. This, the developers insisted, 
was the key: “If customers wish to buy from informal traders, they will still be welcome 
do to so [but if they] prefer to buy from established branded shops in a secure center, 
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that’s their choice too…. At present, they don’t have that choice.”54 Not only would this 
provide necessary resources to the area, but advocates for the mall argued the time was 
ripe. City officials pointed out that the national government was offering additional 
funds for this type of development, just in time for the World Cup.55 
However, the traders instantly called the City’s motives into question, 
expressing resentment at and concerns with the proposal from the start. The initial city 
hall meeting introducing the project met with resistance as traders expressed fears that 
the consequences would ruin their livelihoods. Traders protested that the City failed to 
follow the appropriate processes and that they were not consulted about the 
development. Instead, traders were given two weeks notice to vacate the Early Morning 
Market and move to premises on Alice Street.  Further complaints surfaced as traders 
asked why they needed another mall when there are currently eight within a 10km 
radius of Warwick and “why a ‘first world’ mall was being imposed on ‘third world 
people’?” Warwick Market Traders Association Chairman Harry Ramall summarized 
the traders’ views when he said, “It was presented to us as a proposal but we could 
read between the lines it was not a proposal; it was presented as what we are going to 
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do – close the market and shut it down and relocate us to the materials management 
building. But there was no viability study done.”56 
In the end, the arguments against the development covered a few key issues. 
Perhaps most importantly, the traders and their allies believed inadequate consultation 
was conducted, “even at the conceptual stages.” Moreover, the development was 
predicted to affect between 70,000 – 100,000 workers and their dependents for the 400 
jobs the mall facilities would create.57  In addition, some concerns were raised that, 
although the City and developers may not have been admitting it at the time, the mall 
would continue to pose a threat to traders as it could always expand. In an op-ed in The 
Mercury, academic Tim Quinlin said, “[Although this cannot be stated openly at 
present, shopping malls inevitably feel the pressure to increase revenue and offset 
municipal rates…. Having broken the back of the informal trade, it should be relatively 
easy to expand.”58 The site’s historic integrity was also cited as a justification to 
reconsider development plans, as demolishing the market for a mall would have 
destroyed the area’s historic significance.59  Yet even another argument, that of race, 
arose. Academic Franco Frescura voiced the opinion that the City’s proposal 
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“represents a disregard for the years of struggle of the [black] traders and poor people 
who kept this vital socio-economic institution alive at all costs.”60 
The objections did not desist as traders maintained the “2010 mall would 
starve them.” Instead of being placated by the City’s promises, informal traders alleged 
that City officials attempted to bribe traders to make the development take place and 
planned demonstrations and protests. However, the situation became tenser as events 
progressed. Although traders applied to organize a peaceful march on city hall 
remonstrating the development, police stopped the demonstration, insisting, “The 
traders’ application to stage the march was declined.”  Even external and independent 
actors such as the urban planning consultant Dr. Susanna Godehart took sides, saying 
that as far as she could see, “the development was completely illegal at [that] stage as 
an environmental impact assessment to build on the market site had not been done.” 
Tensions continued to build over the next months as traders continued to fight the 
development. An incident in June 2009 illustrates the degree to which the antagonism 
had reached. The police temporarily closed one market on June 15th, cordoning off the 
area. In response, traders applied for a court order that would allow the vendors to 
continue trading, insisting that the City had been accepting rent for the stalls and could 
not bar the trade. The hostility erupted as the police sealed off the area. While accounts 
differ, at some point the police fired rubber bullets at the traders who attempted to 
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make their way into the market. Traders insisted they were attacked without 
provocation as they were not being violent, and that the police initiated the violence by 
jumping over the wall and beginning to shoot.  The police insisted they were forced to 
fire to contain the traders. Nonetheless, five people sustained minor injuries and had to 
be taken to Addington Hospital, while three people were arrested on public violence 
charges.61  
This incident demonstrates the extent of the tension that had developed between 
the police and traders as a result of the proposed mall development. The debates 
became acrimonious, finally resulting in a Provincial Task Team being called in to hear 
concerns and find an acceptable solution.62 In an op-ed in The Mercury, developer 
Themba Ngcobo insisted that, despite negative media coverage, the development had 
support “from the overwhelming majority of Warwick stakeholders,” including, among 
others, thousands of commuters and members of the public, the Durban Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Warwick Street Traders Committee, ACHIB, and the 
eThekwini Informal Economy Forum.63 On the other side of the aisle, a team of experts, 
ranging from academics to architects to attorneys to activists, joined the effort to save 
the market. Caroline Skinner, Tim Quinlan, Bridgemohan Mahajaj, Richard Dobson, 
Andrew Makin, Franco Frescura, Ashwin Trikamjee, Mahendra Chetty, and Fatima 
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Meer “threw their weight” behind the traders. Summarizing their perspectives, 
Professor Maharaj put it succinctly: “The development of the mall holds grave 
consequences for the city and…would negate all the good work done through the 
rejuvenation project.”64 
Although that particular debate ended as the City gave in and agreed to leave 




Qualitative research in the form of interviews was the primary methodology for 
this study. Although academic articles and newspaper reports supplemented much of 
the information, conversations with the various stakeholders offered recent and 
valuable insight. The nature of the topic dictated the methodology; as this project 
concentrated on the current state of relationships in Warwick Junction, something 
academic literature has not yet examined, the qualitative research methodology worked 
best to capture the most recent information in an open-ended and explorative way. 
Although newspaper articles offered current data, it was often not comprehensive or 
relevant enough. Articles rarely discussed the state of relationships, instead focusing on 
actual events (although these also played an important role in the findings). To best 
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understand the character of current relationships, the personal opinions of the involved 
stakeholders, particularly their views on whether the area is inclusive, were key. The 
biases inherent in people’s personal opinions were extremely relevant, and the research 
process made an effort to identify and account for them. 
To assist with connecting with the necessary stakeholders, I worked closely with 
the staff at Asiye eTafuleni, an NGO based in Warwick Junction which works closely 
with the traders. Not only was I able to interview the founders, Patrick Ndlovu and 
Richard Dobson, who had been City government employees critically involved in the 
iTRUMP Project during the period I was examining, but they were also able to 
introduce me to formal and informal traders.  In addition, Richard Dobson was able to 
offer an introduction and secure my interview with Hoosen Moolla, the Area Manager 
of iTRUMP.  To interview actors with different perspectives, I approached past or 
current City officials. Imraan Buccus, my academic advisor, was able to connect me to 
former City Manager, Michael Sutcliffe, who subsequently gave me names to follow up 
with.  
When choosing my subjects, there was a conscious effort to gather a variety of 
perspectives. I conducted a total of eight interviews, speaking with two informal traders 
and one formal shopkeeper, two members of AeT who were active actors during the 
period I examined, and three City officials who represented the relevant government 
departments: the Business Support Unit and iTRUMP. In many ways, this gave me a 
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diverse range of individuals in relation to racial and gender backgrounds. I spoke to 
black, white and Indian individuals, and interviewed two women in addition to the six 
men. Although there were some gaps in the demographics (no youths or coloureds 
were interviewed), it seems unlikely that those gaps would have made a notable 
difference.  
Before entering the formal interviews, I drafted a list of interview questions 
(Appendix A). Although there were some specific points for certain actors, each 
interview began with gathering basic information about the individual’s history, 
experiences and involvement in Warwick Junction. The intent of this background was 
to better understand the individual’s experience and interests in the area. From there, 
each interview attempted to cover the individual’s general opinion on informal trade, 
the context of the institutions, policies, urban changes and interventions in Warwick 
Junction, and the social relationships in relation to those issues.  
Depending on convenience for the interviewee, the interviews took place in a 
variety of places: cafes, traders’ stalls and offices. For the most part, I was able to 
conduct the interview without a translator. However, there were some communication 
barriers, particularly with the traders for whom English is a second language. Many 
times I had to repeat or reword a question; it seemed as though the essence of the point 
often got lost, which became one of the primary weaknesses of the methodology. 
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A second key weakness was that several of the interviews, specifically the ones 
requiring a translator, were conducted in the presence of an AeT staff member. 
Although it seems unlikely that the traders would have drastically changed their 
responses, it cannot be denied that the presence of another of the involved parties may 
have swayed their responses.  
As a participant, it is impossible to predict how my own presence changed the 
terms of the interview, but it seems highly unlikely that a power dynamic negatively 
affected the conversation. Each interviewee seemed enthusiastic to share his or her 
opinion and did not appear pressured.  
One unexpected addition to my research was the few informal interviews that 
took place. I label these conversations as informal interviews because I did not conduct 
an actual interview with consent forms or questions. They were a result of casual 
conversations with various AeT staff members. However, immediately following these 
conversations, I transcribed as much as possible. This latter information, mostly 
gathered in the beginning of the research process, ultimately provided important and 
much-needed direction to my research.  
The population considered and interviewed for this project was not especially 
vulnerable, making the methodological process uncomplicated. I was able to interview 
a range of actors and as much as possible in the limited time allotted, was able to gather 
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a diverse collection of perspectives.  However, the collaboration and close relationship 
built with AeT poses a potential element of impartiality in the interview respondents.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
Despite attempts to keep this study unbiased, there were, as always, certain 
limitations that were impossible to circumvent. Issues such as personal biases, language 
barriers, logistics, and time constraints presented challenges to obtaining a full picture.  
 In particular, my close relationship with AeT had the potential to create 
concerns. I elected to work with the NGO because I felt my values aligned with theirs. 
Although I attempted to interview unrelated actors, my questions were framed with the 
experience and perspective I had gained at AeT. In addition, members of the AeT team 
made some of my interviews possible, cementing the established relationship and 
ensuing bias. On the part of my subjects, they were all aware of my relationship with 
AeT, which could easily have colored their responses. Most importantly, my connection 
with AeT made it very difficult for me to separate myself from their mindset and made 
a fully objective study challenging to frame. 
 There were other issues that similarly could have arisen due to my presence in 
the research. First of all, my identity as an American and foreigner may have created a 
power dynamic I was unaware of and could not help. When dealing with the slightly 
more vulnerable traders, they may have hesitated to speak to me or answered my 
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questions as they thought they ought to (although none seemed to).  That dynamic may 
have similarly colored my interview with City officials who were eager to present 
Durban in a positive light to a foreigner. In addition, my own hesitations made it 
difficult for me to grasp a full and independent picture. Intimidated by the danger and 
uncertainty of wandering into Warwick alone, I was unable to spend a substantial 
amount of time in the field without an AeT staff member. Also, due to cultural 
implications and my own desire to not offend, there were times when I was unable to 
continue probing a subject or ask difficult questions.  
 Lastly, as always is the case, this project was constrained by time. Although the 
calendar was largely adhered to, more time would have allowed for a fuller and more 
in-depth examination.  
 
Findings 
The intent of this paper is to track the trajectory of Warwick Junction as a site of 
inclusivity in the last twenty years, the immediate post-apartheid till now, November 
2013. Much of the background discussed in the literature review provides this exact 
narrative but to see the full arc, some of the history may be revisited. To put it in broad 
terms, Warwick’s narrative of inclusivity, or lack thereof, may be broken up into three 
key periods: Apartheid and pre-apartheid histories of exclusion and repression, the 
“Golden Era” following the end of the apartheid, and the most recent deterioration of 
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social relations and the return to old, apartheid era tactics. This section of the paper will 
address each period and end with the implications of this trajectory. 
 
Presence and Role of Informal Trade in Durban Today 
As the literature review explained, informal trade is particularly prevalent in 
many developing countries. This continues to be true in South Africa where the 
informal economy contributes to 8-12% of the national GDP.65 However, while many 
may see the informal trade sector as a nuisance, as much of the literature suggests, it 
appears to be an accepted part of the economy. City officials, formal shopkeepers and 
informal traders all recognize its importance and understand that it not only contributes 
to the national economy but also serves as an important safety net.66 As former iTRUMP 
Project Leader Richard Dobson points out, many South Africans are victims of a poor 
education system and are subsequently unqualified to hold a range of jobs; coupled 
with a substantial unemployment rate that particularly affects the youth, street vending 
offers an entry point into the economy.67 It also provides an opportunity for this 
population to pursue entrepreneurial activities.68 When discussing entry points, another 
assertion is that informal trade plays an important role in the transformation of the 
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economy. With a history as racially segregated as South Africa’s, it is also an entry point 
into a freer market economy. Not only is it a factor of economic transformation but it 
also serves as a tool to further cultural transformation because the products and services 
informal traders sell have a cultural significance formal businesses are unable to 
replicate.69 Lastly, connected to the concept of informal trading being a valuable 
contributor to the national economy, it is an important part of the economic distribution 
chain.70 What is remarkable is that actors representing diverse backgrounds, including 
City officials, all agree to the importance of the informal economy, consistently 
acknowledging that it provides an essential safety net for poor South Africans. Yet the 
question is whether that recognition is corroborated by policy and implementation 
towards the informal trade sector.  
 
A History of Exclusion and its Effects  
Globally, informal trade has had a long and repressive history. In South Africa, 
this held particularly true, dating back from the colonial days.71 As the literature review 
covered, colonial policies singled out black South African traders, completely 
criminalizing the muthi trade and restricting all other rights and practices. Street 
vendors were completely at the mercy of oppressive legislation and policing, while 
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blacks were seen to simply be servicing white needs. The apartheid era, beginning in 
1950, only saw more exclusive legislation and marginalization, which had a profound 
effect on Warwick Junction. With Durban being segregated through the apartheid 
mandate, there were few entry points into the city for black South Africans. Warwick 
Junction, on the outskirts of downtown Durban, became that transportation hub and 
soon saw thousands of bustling commuters pass through the area on a daily basis.72 
However, despite the traffic Warwick was seeing, as a black centric area, the apartheid 
government refused to develop the region and the infrastructure remained poor.73 The 
streets and facilities were often unsuitable to the way they were being used, the roads 
and drainage were in disrepair and, in many ways, Warwick was difficult to navigate. 
The segregation from the apartheid manifested itself spatially as certain areas were 
extremely difficult to access and blocked off from others.74  
However, the certain events transpired in Durban during the 1980s which would 
deeply impact informal trade. The Progressive Federal Party won local elections in 
Durban in the early eighties. A more liberal group than the National Party, they 
recognized the importance of street trade, going as far as to commission the Market 
Survey and Hawker Report to assess the current approaches to street trading.75 
Following the publication of these reports, the City Council recognized the need to shift 
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its approach to street trading, finally acknowledging traders as a permanent fixture, and 
a contributing factor to the economy. Although the City recognized the need for a new 
approach, a former City Official says management was daunting.76 At this same time, 
while the country was in chaos from the anti-apartheid protests, enforcement of street 
trading laws became lax and traders began to move back into the cities wherever they 
deemed convenient.77  
As a result, Warwick Junction became a chaotic place, in terms of traders 
crowding the streets and facilities breaking down from overuse and neglect.78 This 
chaos created opportunities for crime, and Warwick soon became home to rampant 
violence. In 1996, it was estimated that there were over 50 murders in the Warwick 
area.79 Traders also recognized the disorder and talked about the “small paths to walk 
through…shacks everywhere. It wasn’t safe to walk there.”80 These pressures created 
hostility all around as police harassed vendors. A traditional medicine healer described 
the conditions as ‘very bad.’ “You couldn’t sit where you wanted to sit. The police 
would come and take all your stuff.”81 This tension escalated to the point that harassed 
traders went as far as to “declare war” on the city police.82 The persecution and 
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exclusion informal traders suffered from the apartheid government and the police was 
taking a serious toll.  
 
The “Golden Era” 
 One note must be made at the start of this section: the very notion that an 
inclusive, “Golden Era” existed has been disputed. Namely, former City Manager 
Michael Sutcliffe insisted one should not “romanticize the 1990s and that it was all 
hunky dory.”83 Yet these conclusions will focus on the perspectives of the traders, 
although it will make some mention of the perspectives of City officials, and assert there 
was a period of inclusivity. 
Warwick Junction, the notorious “crime and grime” area of Durban, began 
attracting the City’s attention. As the City decided to clean up the area, the processes 
were designed to be inclusive and engage the community as much as possible.84 In 1991, 
forced to deal with the overcrowding of traders in Warwick, the City established the 
Department of Informal Trade and Small Business Opportunities (DITSBO), which 
would later become the Business Support Unit (BSU).  In addition, the inner-eThekwini 
Regeneration and Urban Management Program (iTRUMP) was mandated to assist with 
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the regeneration process and clean up the area, specifically through the Urban Renewal 
Project in 1996.85 
There were a few key points considered from the start which played a large role 
in framing the process. For one, as the apartheid era drew to a close and democracy 
became the national mandate, there was a new feeling of reconciliation and a desire to 
engage in inclusive processes. As Richard Dobson, an iTRUMP Project Leader, put it, in 
many ways, there was a national euphoria and energy that the country had avoided an 
outright war and was able to find peace. For Durban and informal trade reform, this 
attitude translated into a conscious effort on the part of the City officials to consult 
traders.86 The actors who led the Project were aware of this, and realized that innovation 
in local governance was a necessity. Dobson said when he started at iTRUMP, he was 
aware of two key facts: that design would be able to mitigate the urban management 
challenges of informal trade, and that any design and implementation process would 
have to be responsive to the needs of informal traders. In particular, there were a few 
considerations which had to be continually kept in mind. Including the beneficiaries of 
the projects was essential to understanding if, for one, the city was responding with the 
right project, and if the technical processes would actually be effective. Lastly, the 
whole process had to be sensitive to the disruption caused by the construction.87  
                                                 




Dobson explained how, for local government, this entailed reconfiguring 
institutional structures. It was clear that normal management processes would not be 
effective, so it was agreed to engage in an area based management (ABM) scheme. 
However, the structure that became the final process was unlike traditional ABMs. 
Instead of creating a new team, which is the most expensive part of the process, the 
project simply assembled officials from existing departments and moved them into one 
building. Although they continued to maintain many of their old tasks, this 
conglomeration of officials made collaboration much easier, as department silos were 
spatially broken down. According to Dobson, from then on, everyone was much more 
involved and there was a surge of energy.88  
This energy assisted with the first challenge the Project tackled, revitalizing the 
herb market facilities.  From this process, the Project leaders were able to learn some 
valuable lessons. In particular, the importance of consultation, innovative designs and 
communicating those designs were critical to completing successful interventions. This 
particular process also illustrated that unforeseen challenges, such as the dispensation 
of facilities, had to be dealt with particularly delicately. In this case, after discovering 
the quality of the new facilities the herb traders would receive, there was a sudden 
increase in the number of healers and traders who needed trading spaces in that 
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market. Consequentially, the Project managers focused on ensuring each trader was 
located appropriately.89  
Many of the actors involved in the regeneration Project echo the same sentiment, 
largely attributing their success to the political and social climate following the 
transition into democracy. The entire operation was a bottom-up process, focused on 
integrating the beneficiaries into the development discussions and decision-making 
process.90 City officials from that time insisted that knowing and respecting the traders’ 
work was critical to being able to work effectively with them. Former Area Based 
Manager for the Business Support Unit Patrick Ndlovu said that they had to “think like 
a trader. We had to put [ourselves] into their shoes.” That included understanding the 
dynamics of their operations, particularly how and why they did things a certain way. 
“Once you understand, then you can try to accommodate that. Asking questions allows 
you to make informed decisions.” This investment in social relations, through the 
capacity and desire to take the time to interact with and understand the traders, was 
crucial.91  
Another essential factor contributing to the success of the Renewal Project is the 
resources available. In addition to the funds Durban was able to allocate to Warwick 
Junction, this ABM area became one of five in KwaZulu-Natal that benefited from a 
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European Union grant. Starting in the early 2000s, the EU gave out a few million rands 
to five ABM initiatives: the airport and industrial estate area, the Kwamashu township, 
a rural area, Cato Manor and iTRUMP in Warwick Junction. This funding, covering a 
three-year period, alleviated some of the pressure on the city to continue pushing the 
project on its own.92 One concern often raised in ABM initiatives is partisan funding, a 
critique Durban had to be aware of when working in Warwick.  
However, despite these factors that contributed to the success stories, there were 
serious challenges for the ABM process in Warwick Junction. Much of the Project’s 
success is attributed to the energy and collaboration of the actors involved; yet this 
methodology and mechanisms to achieve success has implications. An important 
consideration at the time was how to institutionalize the process and ensure its 
sustainability.93 One part of this was formalizing Durban’s policy and approach to 
informal trade through the Informal Economy Policy (IEP). The IEP, adopted in 
February 2001, was unique in that it recognized that the informal economy is critical to 
local economic development as it creates jobs and incomes for many of the area’s poorer 
citizens. Some key findings included: the acknowledgement of the role of the informal 
worker, the suggestion that area-based management zones be created, and a 
commitment by the City to provide support for small business enterprises. For street 
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traders in particular, there were three important acknowledgements that would directly 
impact them, although it must be noted that current progress is less than ideal:94  
• The IEP identified an integrated information system as a critical element for 
moving “towards a better managed, more developmental and coordinated 
approach, with incentives for registration and self-regulation.” Although some 
progress has been made, this system has yet to be established.  
• The IEP suggested the street trader by-laws be re-developed to “reflect the 
overall policy move away from sanction and control, towards support and the 
creation of new opportunities in a well-managed environment.” In 2002, Legal 
Resources Centre drafted a new set of by-laws, but the previous ones remained 
in place as of 2007. 
• The IEP suggested supporting existing organizations to develop a support  
service to help traders by advising them on how to become more 
democratically constituted and providing a venue for these meetings to 
increase trader representation. Instead, the Council established its own 
committees to negotiate with. In addition, the Business Support Unit staff 
developed a standard constitution for these committees which makes 
membership compulsory for permit holders, completely contradicting the 
IEP’s suggestion and violating the people’s constitutional right to association.95 
While the IEP was one mechanism of institutionalization, another important 
aspect of the sustainability of the work was tied to the actors managing the project. 
Michael Sutcliffe, City Manager during this time, critiqued the process, insisting that the 
Project leaders “drove iTRUMP [and the project] as individuals.”96 However, those 
officials, such as Richard Dobson, insist they did their best to make the process as 
independent as possible, attempting to ensure its maintenance.97  
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However, as much as the methods may be critiqued, the Urban Renewal Project 
had many successes. Now, Warwick Junction, an essential part of Durban, is considered 
to be much safer; many traders have established sites to conduct their trading, and there 
is a sense of ownership and pride in the area.98 
 
The Deterioration of Social Relations  
However, despite the progress made by the iTRUMP Project, it seems as though 
the conditions in Warwick Junction may be deteriorating. A former Area Manager said 
that since 2008, “you could tell the City [started] diverting to the old tactics of being 
anti-informal traders.”99 
He added that much of the area is falling back into disrepair. Unsatisfied traders 
complain that the city does a poor job maintaining their facilities, many of which are 
breaking down.100 They insist that it has “been a long time” since the City has helped 
them. They accuse the City of “sending the police to get [our] goods.”101 As the leader of 
the herb market said, “if something’s broken, they’re bad to help come fix it, but quick 
to come collect rent.”102 This statement illustrates how informal traders view the city: 
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reluctant to assist when something breaks or fails to function, a common occurrence, 
according to informal traders interviewed for this project.  
As a result of the deteriorating facilities, social relations between informal traders 
and City officials are similarly breaking down. There is mistrust and a lack of empathy 
for the other perspective on both sides.  When asked about relations with the City and 
current development processes, the traders interviewed expressed disgust and 
skepticism, accusing the City of having its own agenda.103 One declared that the City’s 
“priority is now to build revenue, not to develop” or provide opportunities.104 In 
particular, much of this anger seems directed at the Business Support Unit, the 
government department in charge of management and development of informal traders 
in the Warwick area. Traders have little faith in BSU, insisting “it does bad to the 
traders,” and have even taken to calling it the ‘Business Destroyer Unit.’105 Much of this 
hostility comes from the fact that BSU has seen substantial turnover derived from 
informal trade permits in the last decade, and traders complain that the new officials do 
not understand how things are or should be.106 Another critical point is that BSU pays 
the salaries of the auxiliary police force, the team responsible for impounding traders’ 
goods.107 These are the same police officials who are blamed for harassing traders:  
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“The police are willing to confiscate anything, and try to as much as possible. 
They will walk around the area, stopping at each table and asking the traders for 
permits. If the permits are out of date, they don’t offer a warning, but 
immediately confiscate the goods on the spot. The traders cannot even renew the 
permits when the police come, but must go to another office.”108 
  
In addition, among traders and the organizations that work on their behalf, there 
seems to be a widely held belief that BSU fails to take trader needs into account. The 
proposed 2010 mall is a commonly cited example of the City failing to consult or 
include traders.109 Traders maintain this is a common trend and there is little 
communication. Instead, they complain that “now [the City] just shows us the plan 
without consulting us.”110 
  This frustration further translates into a lack of interest in the current system. The 
head of the herb market, a community leader, expressed her apathy with the “broken 
system.” She complained that current BSU employees have no vision, and that the City 
Manager is a ‘puppet’ of political pressure. No City representative was safe from her 
contempt, including the city council, as she said explained how useless she believes it is 
to vote for City councilors.  
“You have to get one that would understand. So you must vote for councilors 
who understand. We pushed for an old trader to be a councilor but now he’s 
useless too. We would give him a list of requirements but he’s come back and [he 
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says] there’s not enough [in the] budget. Nothing is moving [now]. Everything 
you see now is from the 1990s and 2000s.”111 
 
Another informal trader echoed a similar sentiment when asked about trying to make 
his opinion and needs known.  “I don’t know now, these new people [at BSU]. So many 
times we tried to raise issues but there was nothing done, nobody listened, nothing 
changed. We’re just seen as rubbish people.”112 
On the other side of the spectrum, City officials similarly echo frustration with 
the processes and relations with informal traders. Although accounts differ, officials 
from various departments agree that there are serious tensions between the City and 
traders.  
The current iTRUMP Manager Hoosen Moolla, who has had a long history of 
working in Warwick, insists his department has historically had an excellent 
relationship and engagement with informal traders. He describes iTRUMP’s 
management approach as bottom-up, with consultation being an integral part of any 
decision making process; “we [don’t] just go in there, we [make] an effort to consult 
[them].” Although he concedes that certain projects have caused tension, like the 2010 
mall proposal, he attributes much of the antagonism to BSU-trader relations. “That was 
an instance when the City didn’t go through the ABM approach and hoodwinked 
[everyone].” Although he recognizes relations with traders have not been fully 
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repaired, he, like many of the traders, ascribes the friction to BSU, insisting, “they 
created most of the damage…[they] are the challenge.”113 
 However, BSU officials hold a very different view. BSU Deputy Head Thulani 
Nzama challenges any assertion that relations were tense between BSU officials and 
informal traders. Instead, he attributed any conflict to internal disagreements between 
traders and their own street committees. Insisting that that relationship dynamic is the 
source for “all struggles for power,” Nzama asserts that the influences from street 
committees and external stakeholders, such as NPOs, incite unrest and frustration. In 
addition, he maintains that BSU makes an effort to engage in inclusive processes. There 
are three key forums he cites as opportunities to work with informal traders: 
consultation at the local level, mass meetings every two months that are open to all 
traders and their committees, and ‘The Forum’ meetings, led by City Councilors every 
three months to interact with representatives from trade organizations and the informal 
traders.  
“The process is very effective. Only problem is that when there’s a consultation, 
it doesn’t mean we always agree or [everyone] will be happy. We may agree to 
disagree. Sometimes it’s just ‘this is what we’re planning, here are the pros and 
cons.’ Some people may not be happy but that doesn’t mean we didn’t 
deliver.”114 
 
Nzama’s statement illustrates a key attitude the City holds regarding informal trade: 
that traders create problems by having unrealistic expectations. In particular, Nzama 
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complains of traders being completely unaware of the scope of budgetary challenges. 
He insists that informal traders do not understand the reality of being in the informal 
economy sector, and continue to ask for more resources and services, failing to 
recognize that the funds to deliver those queries do not exist. “But once they start 
getting something, then they just want more,” Nzama said. “They don’t understand 
that to pay for those extra things, we’ll have to charge higher rents and they’ll have to 
pay more. But in their eyes, they only see you as a government official and expect you 
to deliver everything.”  
Former City Manager Michael Sutcliffe reflects this exasperation with trader 
attitudes when he noted the traders’ failure to adjust to modern society. He asserts that 
many of the points informal sector advocates make against development are out of date. 
In particular addressing the 2010 mall controversy, he said, “if we were living in a 
socialist society, you could use those arguments, but I’m sorry. We’re not.” Instead, he 
insists that implementing development plans would show whether the progress he 
championed as City Manager was truly desired by the community. Although this 
assertive implementation approach ultimately caused uproar throughout Warwick 
Junction, he insisted the most effective strategy would have been to “let the community 
decide if they don’t want a mall. If they don’t want the new facilities [such as a mall], 
it’ll fail.”115 
                                                 




 The object of this paper is to track the trajectory of inclusivity in Warwick 
Junction. A few things are now evident: the history of the area is tumultuous but seems 
to cover times of subsequent collaboration, exclusion and repression. However, another 
key point is that many of the accounts vary and any finding this paper concludes is 
likely to be challenged by at least some of the stakeholders. 
 Nonetheless, some effort must be made to explain the end of the “golden era” 
and the “return to old tactics.” A wide range of explanations has been offered, ranging 
from institutional apathy, a few critical moments or unsuitable officials managing the 
area. 
 One crucial moment commonly cited as a catalyst for tension in Warwick was the 
mall proposal for the 2010 World Cup and the ensuing debate. Many, in particular City 
officials, seem to see it as the moment when relations began breaking down, and 
recognized that the damage caused would take a substantial amount of time and effort 
to heal.116 
 Yet that single event does not account for all the conflict surrounding 
development projects in Warwick: traders voiced complaints dating back from the mid 
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2000s.117 Although much of the literature surrounding Warwick Junction is written in 
the mid-2000 period and highlights the area as a shining example of innovative and 
effective ABM, it seems that, while those findings were being documented, hostility was 
brewing. Traders blame turnover at BSU, contending the department is full of new 
people who refuse to collaborate with them and are too arrogant to take the time to 
understand their old system.118  
 A related argument considers the leaders who are now managing BSU rather 
than simply looking at the institution. One change in the last decade, which is likely to 
have affected an ABM initiative, is that iTRUMP’s jurisdiction substantially expanded. 
While iTRUMP, still located in the heart of Warwick, used to focus entirely on Warwick, 
its mandate now covers nine areas, including the Umgeni Estuary and the 
southernmost point of the Durban coast.119 Although iTRUMP officials deny that the 
expansion affected their work in Warwick Junction, a common issue in ABM is that 
when areas change, particularly if they expand, the quality and method of management 
changes as well. On another note, one criticism leveled at the Urban Renewal Project 
leaders is that the institutions and processes were not sustainable. City officials in 
particular argue individuals drove organizations such as iTRUMP.120 While some of the 
leaders who were criticized responded that they did their best to create as many 
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independent thinkers as possible, if this was the case, it could have consequential 
repercussions. A personality-centric project or ABM initiative is less likely to succeed in 
the long term, once those individuals are no longer affiliated to the work.  
 However, one last explanation is the possibility that the deteriorating 
relationships are simply a result of post-apartheid era national energy subsiding. 
Richard Dobson, former Project Leader of iTRUMP, put it plainly: “Quite simply, it 
boils down to the honeymoon period being over.” He attributes the traders’ frustration 
to a lack of problem-solving oriented people supervising the area and the ensuing 
neglect or institutional mismanagement of informal trading. The ABM approach used in 
the late 1990s only temporarily changed how the government conducts business, and 
failed to fully change the nature and attitudes of civil servants and their approaches.121 
 
Conclusions 
 To understand Warwick as a site of inclusivity, this paper narrated the history of 
informal trade in Durban, and what changes have occurred in the past twenty years. 
Although Warwick Junction has had an admirable past of innovative solutions to urban 
development and management, this paper asserts this is no longer the case. While the 
importance of informal trade is widely acknowledged, there is a disconnect between the 
policies created, implementation, and what is desired on the ground. Traders are 
                                                 
121 Dobson Formal Interview 
 62 
vehement in their censure of City management, and even government officials admit 
that Warwick is in desperate need of repair and restoration. Yet both sides acknowledge 
the difficulties of working with their counterparts.  
 This paper has offered a variety of explanations accounting for the deterioration 
of management methods, and with them social relations. Yet the case remains that there 
is a lack of analysis in academic literature, virtually all of which simply examines 
Warwick until the mid 2000s. Whether it is simply the effect of negative turnover in a 
government department, or a failed ABM process, something shifted drastically. One 
intriguing possibility is that this is the result of the post-apartheid euphoria wearing off. 
This premise has interesting implications as to the sustainability of policies and how a 
fledging democracy fares a few decades later. 
Nonetheless, there are substantive issues preventing innovation and 
collaboration from growing in Warwick. In particular, a lack of communication and 
conflicting ideologies pose considerable challenges. In cases such as the 2010 mall, 
traders see the development, as it is proposed, as a threat to their livelihood, and 
consequently resist it. As a result, the City sees the traders as adverse to any progress or 
improvement. This conflict makes the City less likely or willing to work with the 
traders, further infuriating them and creating a perpetuating cycle. However, there is a 
disconnect in that traders are not necessarily opposed to development, but need to be 
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included in the process.122  Yet in the end, in many ways, the progress informal traders 
would be likely to support would be development that improves their infrastructure 
and facilities, rather than changing the nature of trading opportunities. Perhaps it 
simply comes down to differing definitions of development and ideological opinions 
that cannot be reconciled.  
It appears that the City perspective follows the “Western” notions of 
development, while others advocate maintaining the historical integrity of the informal 
sector. Perhaps there is simply a tension between different urban management 
philosophies, and conflicting opinions on how to shape Durban’s urban future.  
 This paper asserts that this is the crux of the issue, and fundamentally what the 
issues have been and will continue to be about. However, as the case stands, the City 
and informal trade sector stand at polar ends, unable to reach an ideological 
compromise. Whether or not this agreement is possible is not addressed in this paper. It 
may well be the case that an innovatively inclusive city has discovered how to maintain 
the heritage of informal trade while keeping up with global expectations of “world-class 
urbanism.”123 It can only be hoped that such an understanding can be reached in 
Warwick Junction.  
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• Profession  
• Length of residence in Durban 
 
General Opinions on Trade 
• In your opinion, what is the role of informal trade in the national economy? 
 
Context (institutions, policy, urban changes and interventions)  
• What has been/is your involvement in Warwick Junction 
• How long were/have you been involved in that capacity? 
• Have you observed urban changes over time? 
o What led to these changes? 
o What were the interventions implemented, and what were the motivations? 
 City officials: what kind of support, resource and mandates did/do you 
have from the national/provincial government? 
 
Social Relations (in relation to the above) 
• How long have relations between stakeholders (government officials, traders, and their 
organizations or third parties) been historically? 
o How have they changed? 
• Has there been an effort to include informal traders in development and policy talks? 
o If so, how would you rate that effort? 
o Who were the key players involved? 
o What were the critical moments? 
• What were the biggest challenges you faced? 
 
Current 
• In your mind, what would be an ideal policy regarding Warwick Junction? 

















Appendix B: Timeline of Events and the Implications 
 
YEAR EVENT  IMPLICATIONS 
1891  Chapter 14 Code of Natal Law  Legislation limiting muthi trade 
1895 Zululand Proclamation Further legislation limiting muthi trade 
1897 Act No. 18 Legislation restricting licenses for wholesale and 
retail dealers; gave discretionary power to refuse 
licenses 
1909  Native Beer Act Established a municipality monopoly on beer 
negatively affecting beer traders 
1910  Traders begin selling at Early Morning Market 
1916  Native Affairs By-Laws Durban Town Council establishes precise 
procedures for the registration of “Natives,” 
limiting their access into the city 
1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act A result of Stallard Commission Report and, 
concluding “Africans were only required in cities 
to service white needs,” they should depart back 
to the reserves  
1928 Medical, Dental and Pharmacy 
Act 
Further legislation limiting muthi trade 
1945 Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act  
Imposed restrictions on economic activities in 
“black areas” 
1950 Group Areas Act Excluded people from areas of the city based on 
their race, effectively barring Africans from 
trading 
1957 Witchcraft Suppression Act Completely illegalizes open trading of medicine 
and herbs 
1962 Durban Street Trading By-Laws Outlawed street trading in the city 
1973 Natal Ordinance Established “move along” laws which forced 
informal traders to move from their vending site 
within fifteen minutes 
Late 
1970’s 
Hawkers Action Committee Mounted a protest against Durban for its 
mistreatment of hawkers in the area 
Early Progressive Federal Party wins A more liberal party than the National Party, the 
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1980’s local Durban election  PFP commissions the Market Survey and Hawker 
Report to assess current approaches to street 
trading 
1983 Market Survey published Report assessing approaches to street trading 
1984 Hawker Report published Survey of traders which, in conjunction to the 
Market study, found ways to reform policies 
1985 Councilor Subcommittee 
established 
A city committee established to attempt to find 
ways to implement more practical and favorable 
policies for street traders 
Mid 
1980’s 
 National influx control laws become 
unenforceable  
1987 National White paper of 
Privatization and Deregulation 
National government publication suggesting a 
more tolerant approach to black, small businesses 
1991  Businesses Act National legislation helped to deregulate business 
activities, removed barriers to the operation of 
informal activities and made it an offense to move 
along laws 
1991 Department of Informal Trade 
and Small Business Operations 
(DITSBO) established 
Department formed to reconsider Durban’s 
approach to informal trade 
1993 Amended Business Act Allowed local authorities to create municipality 
by-laws, in particular declaring restricted and 
prohibited time zones  
1994  First democratic election in South Africa  
1994 Durban Health Department 
introduces health training 
program for traders 
Traders are no longer seen as temporary 
participants 
1994 Self Employed Women’s Union 
established 
Organization established on the behalf of traders, 
to protect traders 
1995 Durban by-laws published Some inner city areas became prohibited trade 
zones but most became restricted trade sites. 
However, in conjunction with national legislation, 
traders who breached the by-laws or traded in 
prohibited areas were subject to fines and their 
goods being impounded 
1995 Informal Traders Management 
Board (ITMB) established 
Another organization established to represent 
traders and create communication pathways 
between traders, city and council to negotiate 
1996 Urban Renewal Project launched A major regeneration project for Warwick 
Junction 
1997 Traders Against Crime formed Collaborative effort between traders, South 
African Police Service and the Durban 
Metropolitan Police 
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1997-2000  Urban Renewal Project delivers over R40 million 
in capital works and reform 
1999 Informal Economy Policy task 
team formed 
 
2000 Municipalities Act  Mandates a democratic decision making process, 
including stakeholder consultation, in the 
municipality 
2001  Durban adopts a new, inclusive policy towards 
street traders 
June 2004  Metro police seize traders’ goods at various 
points across cities  
November 
2004 
Council approves Public Realm 
Management Project 
A R3.7 million budget assigned to a project to 
employ and equip 50 Metro police officers to 
patrol informal trade areas 
December 
2005 
Siyagunda established Organization of street barbers to protect and 
represent their rights 
November 
2006 
Trader march on city council Siygunda, the Eye and the Phoenix Plaza 
Association went to city council to deliver memo 
of demands to stop police harassment 
2008 Asiye eTafuleni established A Warwick Junction advocacy group formed to 
work with traders and city officials 
2009 Durban city council proposes 
mall development in Warwick 
Junction 
Results in massive uproar and uprising across 
Warwick Junction  
April 2013 Raid on taxi drivers and informal 
traders 
 
 
